Removing Bricks from a Wall of Discrimination: State Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Laws by Brantner, Paula A.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 19
Number 2 Winter 1992 Article 5
1-1-1992
Removing Bricks from a Wall of Discrimination:
State Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Laws
Paula A. Brantner
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation




Removing Bricks from a Wall of
Discrimination: State Constitutional
Challenges to Sodomy Laws
By PAULA A. BRANTNER*
Laws regulating sodomy and other forms of same-sex sexual activity
currently exist in twenty-five states and the District of Columbia.1
Although sodomy laws are rarely enforced, their very presence inhibits
the expression of gay sexuality. Gay parents have been denied child cus-
tody and visitation rights,2 gay employees have been denied security
clearances and employment,3 and gay organizations have been denied the
right to legal existence,4 all either directly or indirectly as a result of
sodomy laws.5 Our courts brand all gay men and lesbians as criminals,
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A., Michigan State University, 1989. The author would
like to express her thanks to Leonard Graff, Sue Hyde, David Piontkowsky, Bill Rubenstein,
the Texas Human Rights Foundation, and Arlene Zarembka for their assistance with earlier
drafts of this Note.
1. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411-1412
(1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1989); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Harrison 1990); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-6605 (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.070
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.89 (West 1986); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 272, § 34 (West 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1987); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 750.158, 750.338-.338(b) (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West
1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101, 45-5-505 (1990); NEv. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1986); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-10-1 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
13-510 (1989); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.01(1), 21.06 (West 1989); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-403 (1978); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 1988).
2. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
5. Sodomy laws have been used directly to prohibit individual gay men and lesbians from
having certain rights (e.g., as an unconvicted criminal, a lesbian or gay man is not entitled to a
particular right). Sodomy laws are also used indirectly to deny group rights (eg., because
there is not a fundamental right to engage in sodomy, gay men and lesbians are not entitled to
legal protection from anti-gay discrimination).
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whether or not they actually engage in sodomy.6
Gay and lesbian activists consider the eradication of sodomy laws
essential to the further advancement of gay rights. While every state had
sodomy laws prior to the 1960s, efforts by reformers7 have reduced the
number of states with sodomy laws to twenty-five.' In 1986, Georgia
activists attempted to invalidate the remaining state sodomy laws on fed-
eral constitutional grounds. In Bowers v. Hardwick,9 a gay man chal-
lenged Georgia's sodomy law primarily on the basis of the right to
privacy guaranteed by the federal constitution. 10 The Supreme Court re-
fused to extend the right to privacy to include consensual same-sex sex-
ual behavior. Justice White, writing for the majority, specifically granted
the power to states to regulate such behavior.'1 Following this decision,
state legislatures contemplating reform would no longer act on the as-
6. "By defining gay people as persons who commit sodomy... courts overemphasize the
importance of certain types of homosexual sex and devalue love and companionship in a ho-
mosexual relationship." See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAw 10 (Harv. L. Rev. ed.
1989), reprinted from Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARv.
L. REV. 1508 (1989) [hereinafter HARVARD]. See, eg., Head v. Newton, 596 S.W.2d 209
(Tex. Ct. App. 1980) (found calling an individual "queer" constituted slander per se, because it
imputes the crime of sodomy).
7. "Pressure to liberalize [sodomy] laws first came from medical, social-welfare, and
legal groups.... Homosexual organizations played a quiet role in the initial lobbying to repeal
sodomy laws." PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS: SIXTEEN AMERI-
CANS WHO FOUGHT THEIR WAY TO THE SUPREME COURT 384 (1990).
8. Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 166, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 219; Act of May 12, 1975, ch.
71, §§ 4-12, 1975 Cal. Stat. 131, 133-136; Colorado Criminal Code, cbs. 40-3-403, 40-3-404,
1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 388, 423; Conn. Penal Code, Pub. Act No. 828, §§ 66-91, 1969 Conn.
Pub. Acts 1554, 1579-85; Delaware Criminal Code, ch. 497 §§ 766, 767, 58 Del. Laws 1611,
1665-66 (1972); Hawaii Penal Code, Act 9, §§ 733-735, 1972 Hawaii Sess. Laws 32, 90-01; Act
of Feb. 25, 1976, Pub. Law No. 148, ch. 4 § 2, 1976 Ind. Acts 718, 733-734; Iowa Criminal
Code, ch. 1245, §§ 901-906, 1976 Iowa Acts 549, 558-559; Maine Criminal Code, ch. 499,
§§ 251-255, 1975 Me. Laws 1273, 1297-1300; Nebraska Criminal Code, L.B. 38 §§ 32-38, 1977
Neb. Laws 88, 100-102; Act of July 2, 1973, ch. 532:26, 1973 N.H. Laws 999, 1011; New
Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, ch. 95, §§ 14:1 to 14:3, 1978, N.J. Laws 482, 547-550; Act of
Apr. 3, 1975, ch. 109, 1975 Laws 265, 266-267; Act of Dec. 14, 1972, §§ 2907.01-.07, 1972
Ohio Laws 1966, 1906-1911; Oregon Criminal Code of 1971, §§ 104-120, 1971 Or. Laws 1873,
1907-1910; Crimes Code, No. 334, ch. 31, 1972 Pa. Laws 1983, 1528-31; Act of Feb. 26, 1976,
ch. 158, §§ 22-2 to -4, 1976 S.D. Sess. Laws 227, 260-261; Washington Criminal Code, ch.
260, § 9A.88.100, 1975 Wash. Laws 817, 858; Act of Mar. 11, 1976, ch. 43, 1976 W. Va. Acts
241; Act of Feb. 24, 1977, cl. 70, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 228, 228-310 (quoting Yao Apasu-
Gbotsu et al., Note, Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual
Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 526-27 (1986)).
9. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
10. The sole issue in Hardwick, because of the procedural posture of the case, was "the
appropriate standard of review, not the validity of the statute." Brief for Respondent at 4,
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140). Therefore, Professor Laurence Tribe, when
writing the brief, and at oral arguments, presented only arguments relating to "whether a state
must have a substantial justification when it reaches that far into so private a realm." Brief for
Respondent at 5.
11. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195-96.
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sumption that sodomy statutes would be declared unconstitutional. The
Hardwick decision thus removed one incentive to reform the sodomy
statutes, which may explain why no legislatures have eliminated sodomy
laws after Hardwick.
In the past few years, gay and lesbian activists, attempting to re-
cover from the adverse effects of Hardwick and the accumulation of con-
servative federal court judicial appointments,12 have called for
alternatives to federal court litigation to achieve legal equality for gay
men, lesbians, and bisexuals.13 One strategy is to challenge sodomy laws
in state courts on state constitutional grounds. The most important rea-
son to use this approach is that state constitutions differ from the feddral
constitution, and thus are able to guarantee more rights to state citizens
than the federal constitution. Additionally, state court judges may be
more receptive to innovative state constitutional claims than federal
judges who are ever conscious of the criticism directed at judicial activ-
ism. 14 Kentucky, 15 Michigan,' 6 and Texas17 recently invalidated state
sodomy statutes on state constitutional grounds. Although these suc-
cesses were at the trial court level, and thus have little precedential value,
the victories encourage activists in other states that have similar state
constitutional provisions.
This Note first examines the use of sodomy laws to perpetuate anti-
gay discrimination. Next, the Note assesses the impact of Hardwick
upon sodomy law reform and chronicles the subsequent change of focus
of reform litigation from federal to state constitutional theory. The mer-
its of arguments for and against state constitutional challenges, as well as
the varieties of constitutional challenges that may be made, are discussed.
Finally, the Note evaluates which challenges are most likely to be suc-
cessful in particular states.
I. State Sodomy Laws
A. Enactment and Reform
Laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual activity' s currently
12. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
13. See infra section III.
14. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
15. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 86M859 (Fayette Dist. Ct. Oct. 31, 1986). See infra
note 130 and accompanying text.
16. Michigan Org. for Human Rights v. Kelley, No. 88-815820 CZ, opinion and order
(Mich. Cir. Ct. July 9, 1990). See infra notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
17. Morales v. State, No. 464, 898 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Mar. 15, 1990). See infra note 131 and,
accompanying text.
18. This Note uses the term "sodomy" to refer to laws prohibiting either same-sex or non-
procreative heterosexual sexual activity. States may use terms other than sodomy, such as
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exist in twenty-five states and the District of Columbia.' 9 Prior to 1961,
all fifty states had criminalized sodomy.2" In 1955, the American Law
Institute determined that sodomy laws would not be included in the
Model Penal Code.2 Illinois was the first state to follow the ALI's rec-
ommendation, and in 1961, decriminalized all consensual, adult, private
sexual conduct. 2 Connecticut was the next state to decriminalize sod-
omy in 1969,23 and throughout the 1970s, twenty state legislatures re-
pealed their state's sodomy laws.24' Wisconsin was the last state to date
to decriminalize sodomy, in 1982.25 Sodomy statutes in New York and
Pennsylvania were invalidated by the highest state courts in both states.26
B. Impact of Sodomy Statutes
Many people share a common perception that sodomy laws have
little real impact because they are rarely enforced.27 This perception is
incorrect for two reasons. First, sodomy laws are enforced,28 and such
enforcement can ruin the lives of those prosecuted2 9 for behavior engaged
in by people of all sexual orientations. Second, even if sodomy laws were
"sexual misconduct" or "crime against nature," but these laws are still generally known as
sodomy laws. See HARVARD, supra note 6.
Traditionally, the word "sodomy" has referred to anal sex between two men, and thus
excluded oral sex or any sexual activity between women. "There are still people who say that
to commit sodomy one has to have a penis." Abby R. Rubenfeld, Lessons Learned: A Reflec-
tion Upon Bowers v. Hardwick, 11 NOVA L. REv. 59, 60 n.3 (1986). However, laws today
may proscribe sexual activity between women. See State v. Young, 193 So. 2d 243 (La. 1966).
Thus the author uses the word sodomy for the sake of convenience, while recognizing that
in certain states other terms may be more accurate, and that the word has been traditionally
male-identified even though such laws also may be used against women.
19. See supra note 1.
20. Shelley R. Lieck, Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Sodom)y Statutes in the Con-
text of Homosexual Activity After Bowers v. Hardwick, 32 S.D. L. REv. 323, 325 (1987).
21. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 207.5 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
22. Criminal Code of 1961, §§ 11-2, 11-3, 1961 Ill. Laws 1985-2006 (codified as amended
at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11-2, 11-3 (Smith-Hurd 1979 & Supp. 1983)).
23. 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 828, § 214 (effective Oct. 1, 1971).
24. See supra note 8.
25. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.17 (West 1982).
26. People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d
47 (Pa. 1980).
27. Hardwick, Sodomy Laws, and Our Fight for Sexual Freedom, NATIONAL GAY AND
LESBIAN TAsK FORCE [hereinafter Fight for Sexual Freedom] (on file with the Hastings Consti-
tutional Law Quarterly).
28. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text for situations where sodomy laws are
enforced.
29. Those arrested for sodomy may be subjected to unwarranted media attention, because
their names may be published in local newspapers, and their trials publicized. A sodomy
charge may cause them to lose their jobs and jeopardize relationships with family and friends.
They can be physically assaulted by police during the arrest, by other inmates in jail, and by
gay-bashers once their identity is made known to others.
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never enforced, their existence prevents gay men and lesbians from gain-
ing full equality, and is repeatedly used to justify differential treatment of
gay men and lesbians.30 One activist characterized sodomy laws as "one
of the last ... final institutional discriminations against gay people."3
Sodomy laws are enforced in a number of situations. Prosecutors
have used sodomy laws as a plea-bargaining tool in situations where the
sodomy offense was accompanied by other violations such as public solic-
itation, aggravated assault, or statutory rape.32 If prosecutors are unable
to demonstrate lack of consent in a rape case, they may ask for a sodomy
conviction instead, because lack of consent is not an element of the sod-
omy offense.33 Police on duty in areas where gay men commonly meet
have attempted to entrap gay men by encouraging men to have sex with
them. When the men respond, they are charged with sodomy, solicita-
tion, or conspiracy to commit sodomy.34 In some cases, individuals have
been arrested for having consensual, non-commercial sex, 35 because they
were discovered in areas that may be defined as either public or private.36
Although arrests for private, consensual, adult activity are relatively
rare, primarily owing to the difficulty of monitoring such behavior, such
arrests do happen. Michael Hardwick, the plaintiff in Bowers v. Hard-
wick,37 is an example of such an arrest. The mere existence of sodomy
laws invites police intrusion into sexual behavior, and allows for selective
enforcement to harass gay individuals.38
30. See, eg., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd, 895 F.2d 564, 577 (9th Cir. 1990) (security clearance); J.P. v. P.W.,
772 S.W.2d 786, 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (child custody); In re Appeal in Pima County Juve-
nile Action B-10489, 727 P.2d 830, 835 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (adoption).
31. Dan Freedman & Faith Keenan, Gays Laud End of Restrictions on Immigration, S. F.
EXAMINER, Oct. 30, 1990, at A5, (quoting Robert Bray, National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force). Abby Rubenfeld, former director of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund
claims, "We (lesbians and gay men] are criminals in the eyes of the law, and that is used
against us.... [Sodomy laws] are the nails in the closet doors." Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at
61.
32. HARVARD, supra note 6, at 9-10.
33. Id.
34. Fight for Sexual Freedom, supra note 27. Arlene Zarembka, a Missouri attorney, de-
scribes typical police practices in that state. "The police regularly solicit the men for sex. The
officer asks a man to go home with him and then arrests him. There doesn't even have to be
any physical contact." Paul Reidinger, Missouri Vice: Sodomy Ban Affirmed, 72 A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 1, 1986, at 78.
35. For purposes of this Note, non-commercial sex is defined as sexual activity where
neither of the participants expects pecuniary gain.
36. Fight for Sexual Freedom, supra note 27. Parties may have an expectation of privacy
in areas such as lovers lanes, beaches, or wooded areas, even though they are not in a private
bedroom.
37. See Section II.C.
38. Eight Good Reasons to Decriminalize Sexuality, NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK
FORCE (NGLTF Privacy Project, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Good Reasons] (on file with
the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly).
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Even if sodomy laws were never enforced, their mere existence has
been used to deny rights to gay men and lesbians, whether or not they
engage in behavior proscribed by the statutes. These laws substantially
hinder gay rights reform in other areas. The courts have specifically used
sodomy laws to deny child custody and visitation rights to lesbian and
gay parents. Gay .parents are considered criminals yet to be convicted,similar to substance abusers or gamblers, and are thus unfit parents.39
Even if courts do not deem gay parents criminals, they hold that sodomy
laws demonstrate a state interest against homosexuality.' Gay employ-
ees have been denied security clearances based upon their "lack of regard
for the laws of society.."'4 1 The Department of Defense, CIA, FBI, and
the armed forces all presently have policies adversely affecting gay em-
ployees.42 Gay individuals may be denied employment entirely, be sub-
jected to more extensive investigations before security clearances are
granted, or may be prohibited from gaining upper-level clearances, which
may severely limit career advancement.43 Universities have refused to
recognize gay and lesbian student organizations because of the miscon-
ception that these organizations would further violations of the sodomy
statutes.44
Sodomy statutes classify non-procreative sexual activity as inferior.
While this classification primarily denigrates lesbians and gay men, other
groups suffer harm as well. Many disabled persons are limited to certain
types of sexual activity. Sodomy laws insult the disabled by denying
them any legal means of sexual expression. Some state-funded institu-
tions caring for the disabled have instructed employees to intervene in
order to prevent the violation of sodomy laws by their residents.45 Sod-
omy laws adversely impact women by limiting legal sexual activity to
that which can lead to procreation, and thereby foreclosing those means
39. See N.K.M. v. L.E.M, 606 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) ("Suppose the per-
sona non grata were a habitual criminal, or a child abuser, or a sexual pervert, or a known
drug pusher? To cut off association with such a person as a condition to the child custody
would be entirely reasonable.").
40. HARVARD, supra note 6, at 128. See, e.g., L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
41. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1365
(N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) (gay civilian employees of defense indus-
try contractors were automatically subjected to extended investigations before security clear-
ances could be granted).
42. HARVARD, supra note 6, at 46.
43. Id
44. Although courts have generally rejected the universities' arguments, students nonethe-
less had to bring lawsuits to obtain recognition. See Gay Student Serv. v. Texas A & M Univ.,
737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984); Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 854 (8th Cir.
1977).
45. National Day of Mourning Information Packet, NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK
FORCE (NGLTF Privacy Project, Washington, D.C.), June 30, 1989, at 10 [hereinafter NDOM
Packet] (on file with the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly).
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of sexual expression which do not have that intended result and carry
less serious consequences.46
Sodomy laws may also affect an individual's psychological and phys-
ical well-being. Sex educators and mental health professionals believe
the criminalization of sexuality hampers the development of a healthy
and freely chosen sexual identity.47' In an era where dissemination of
safe-sex information is crucial to prevent the transmission of AIDS, state
officials in Arkansas, Georgia, and North Carolina censored educational
materials because the officials believed the materials encouraged "law-
lessness."48 Even to the extent they remain unenforced, sodomy laws
generate a wide array of adverse effects which unjustly target not only
gay men and lesbians, but a number of others as well.
II. Bowers v. Hardwick and its Aftermath
A. Development of the Right to Privacy
"Although, '[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any
right of privacy,' the Court has recognized that one aspect of the
'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is, 'a right of personal privacy or a guarantee of cer-
tain areas or zones of privacy.' ""
The right to privacy was first outlined in The Right to Privacy, an
1890 law review article by Samuel D. Warren and Lewis D. Brandeis.50
Brandeis, who later joined the Supreme Court, articulated the right to
privacy as "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men."5" The right to privacy first
commanded a Supreme Court majority in the case of Griswold v. Con-
necticut.52 Griswold held that married couples' use of contraceptives was
protected by the right to privacy. The Court found that a number of
guarantees in the Bill of Rights, including the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
and Ninth Amendments, created a constitutionally protected zone of pri-
vacy.53 The statute's prohibition of contraception was found "repulsive
46. Such consequences include pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases that are more
easily transmitted to women by vaginal intercourse.
47. See Good Reasons, supra note 38.
48. NDOM Packet, supra note 45, at 9. Because each of these states have sodomy laws,
materials encouraging safer sex could be construed as encouraging readers of the materials to
violate these laws.
49. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).
50. Samuel D. Warren & Lewis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193
(1890).
51. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
52. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
53. Id. at 484.
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to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."54
Seven years later, Eisenstadt v. Baird extended the zone of privacy to
include contraception choices for unmarried adults." The Court found
[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the indi-
vidual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmen-
tal intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
The Court established the home as a zone of privacy in Stanley v.
Geowgia a case which upheld the right of individuals to possess pornog-
raphy in their own homes.57 The Court stated, "Whatever may be the
justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they
reach into the privacy of one's own home." 8 When governmental regu-
lation intrudes on a zone of privacy, it "may be justified only by a 'com-
pelling state interest,' and... legislative enactments must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake."59
Prior to Hardwick, the Court had not yet considered whether pri-
vate consensual sexual behavior among adults was constitutionally pro-
tected. In Carey v. Population Services International, another
contraception case, the Court explicitly refused to answer that question
because the case could be decided on more narrow grounds.' The logi-
cal next step in privacy jurisprudence seemed to be to constitutionally
protect private consensual sexual activity, and a good method of deter-mining how the Court would define the outer boundaries of the right of
privacy was a challenge to a sodomy law enforced when the sexual activ-
ity was private, consensual, and between two adults.6 '
B. Bowers v. Hardwick-The Sodomy Law Challenge
Bowers v. Hardwick appeared to be the ideal case for challenging the
54. Id. at 486.
55. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
56. Id. at 453.
57. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
58. Id, at 565.
59. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
60. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. "'Ihe Court has not definitively an-
swered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state stat-
utes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults,' and we do not purport to
answer that question now." Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1977)
(quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 n.17). Other commentators, however, believed that by implica-
tion, the right of privacy would extend that far. See David A.J. Richards, Sexual Autonomy
and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case-Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten
Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrru-
TIONAL LAW 944 n.12 (1978); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89
YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
61. See Richards, supra note 60.
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constitutionality of sodomy laws to the United States Supreme Court. 2
An Atlanta police officer arrested Michael Hardwick for consensual sex-
ual behavior with another adult in the privacy of his own home.
Georgia defines sodomy as "any sexual act involving the sex organs
of one person and the mouth or anus of another. '6 3 The statute, which
prohibits both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy, applies equally to
married and unmarried persons, and carries a penalty of up to twenty
years in prison." When Hardwick was arrested, he was charged with
committing the crime of sodomy, although Atlanta police generally
charged gay men with the lesser crime of "public indecency."
65
Although the district attorney's office declined to prosecute,6: Hardwick
remained subject to indictment until the four-year statute of limitations
expired. 7 It was also possible for Hardwick to undergo an extended
court battle. At the time of his arrest, he was employed in a gay bar,
which lessened the danger of exposure which causes many defendants to
forego public challenges so as to protect their jobs and their families.68
Activists in Georgia had waited five years to find an appropriate test
case: they believed they finally had one in Michael Hardwick.
69
C. Facts of Bowers v. Hardwick
"Think about a police officer at the foot of your bed when you are in
bed with someone. Keep that in mind when you are talking about this
subject. That is what happened to Michael Hardwick."70 In 1982,
Michael Hardwick was arrested in his home by an Atlanta police officer
for violating Georgia's sodomy statute. Hardwick had been ticketed
three weeks earlier for drinking in public, and due to a discrepancy in the
dates listed on the ticket, had missed his court appearance. He paid the
ticket the day after his missed appearance, but in the meantime, the At-
lanta officer had obtained a warrant for his arrest. Three weeks after
62. "It was a great case to bring. We had a good shot at winning.... This case presented
the best factual pattern. We may never get another one like it." Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at
62.
63. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (Harrison 1990). Many states retain the Blackstone defi-
nition of sodomy as the "crime against nature," which referred only to anal sex. See infra
Section IV.C.
64. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(b) (Harrison 1990) (penalty of not less than one year nor
more than 20 years for conviction under statute).
65. IRONS, supra note 7, at 383.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 397. Hardwick still faced a number of hardships related to his court battle,
however. He was forced to live and work under an assumed name throughout the litigation,
and was unable to move from Georgia for fear of jeopardizing his standing to challenge the
law. Id. at 398.
69. Id. at 396.
70. Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at 60.
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Hardwick had paid his ticket, the officer went to Hardwick's home to
serve the warrant and was admitted by a guest staying there. Because the
ticket had been paid, the officer's warrant was invalid.71 Nonetheless,
Hardwick was arrested for violating the sodomy laws by engaging in oral
sex in his bedroom. Hardwick then spent twelve hours in jail harassed by
other prisoners who were told the nature of his arrest.72
Attorneys from the Georgia ACLU contacted Hardwick within
days to tell him they were looking for an appropriate test case. To begin
the appellate process, Hardwick needed an adverse judgment. The dis-
trict attorney refused to present Hardwick's case to a grand jury, so
Hardwick's attorneys insisted upon obtaining a letter indicating that the
district attorney had no intentions of further prosecution, to serve as the
necessary state court judgment. 73 Hardwick's attorneys then proceeded
on the federal level, seeking a declaratory judgment on the constitution-
ality of the Georgia statute. Hardwick lost at the district court level, but
was successful in the 1 lth Circuit Court of Appeals,74 where a two-judge
majority found that Hardwick's behavior was constitutionally
protected.
75
D. Bowers v. Hardwick-The Decision
The State of Georgia appealed its defeat to the United States
Supreme Court. Georgia asked the Court to avoid creating a "constitu-
tional right which is little more than one of self-gratification and indul-
gence," 76 basing its position upon "centuries-old tradition and the
conventional morality of its people."'77 Hardwick was represented by
Professor Laurence Tribe, who framed the issue not in terms of specific
same-sex behavior, but in terms of "how every adult, married or unmar-
ried, in every bedroom in Georgia will behave in the closest and most
intimate personal association with another adult.
' 78
The Court announced its decision on June 30, 1986.79 Justice White
wrote for a 5-4 majority which voted to overturn the 1lth Circuit deci-
sion and found the Georgia statute constitutional. The majority defined
71. IRONS, supra note 7, at 396. The arresting officer had a good faith belief in the validity
of the warrant, and therefore would be able to introduce any evidence found in court. See
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (use of evidence not barred if obtained under a
warrant which the officer believed in good faith was valid).
72. IRONS, supra note 7, at 396.
73. Id. at 398.
74. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (1lth Cir. 1985).
75. Id at 1211.
76. Oral Argument on Behalf of the Petitioner at 16, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (No. 85-140).
77. Id.
78. Oral Argument on Behalf of the Respondents at 18, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986) (No. 85-140).
79. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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the issue before the Court as "whether the Federal Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy ... ."80 The
Court found prior privacy cases inapplicable as precedents, because "[n]o
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand
and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated . ".8.."'I
Therefore, constitutionally protecting Hardwick's behavior would have
created a new fundamental right, which the Court was most reluctant to
do.82 Fundamental rights are limited to those either "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty"8 or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."84 Since sodomy traditionally had been proscribed, and was at
the time prohibited by roughly half the states, a claim that a right to
engage in sodomy was fundamental was deemed "facetious" by the
Court.8 5
The Court distinguished Stanley as a First Amendment case, not a
privacy case, and therefore not applicable to Hardwick.8" The Court re-
jected Hardwick's claim that Georgia must provide a rational basis for
the law, and that Georgia's "presumed belief ... that homosexual sod-
omy is immoral and unacceptable," was insufficient to satisfy the rational
basis standard,87 indicating that morality was indeed a sufficient basis
upon which to uphold the law.88
Chief Justice Burger wrote a separate concurrence to emphasize his
belief that "[t]o hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow
protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of
moral teaching."89 He outlined a brief history of sodomy laws, noting
sodomy's prohibition "throughout the history of Western civilization,"
and found condemnation of sodomy "firmly rooted in Judaeo-Christian
moral and ethical standards."90 One may question whether beliefs essen-
tially reflecting religious principles should be enshrined in the law of a
80. Id at 190.
81. Id at 191.
82. Justice White, writing for the court, stated:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
design of the Constitution.... There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand
the substantive reach of [the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments], particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to
be fundamental.
Id. at 194-195.
83. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
84. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
85. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194.
86. Id. at 195. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
87. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
88. Id
89. Id. at 197.
90. Id. at 196.
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nation that values and mandates the separation of church and state.91
Chief Justice Burger's argument reflects agreement with the majority's
assertion that "if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be
invalidated... the.courts will be very busy indeed." 92
Justice Powell wrote a separate concurrence to focus on his Eighth
Amendment concerns. The Georgia statute permitted a sentence of up
to twenty years for a sodomy conviction.93 Justice Powell indicated that
if Hardwick had actually been convicted and sentenced for a single, pri-
vate, consensual act, he believed that Hardwick would have been pro-
tected under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment.94
If Justice Blackmun had been the author of the majority opinion
instead of Justice White, the statuses of both privacy litigation and gay
rights litigation today would be significantly different. Justice Blackmun,
who was joined in dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens,
rejected the majority's narrow characterization of the question posed by
the case as the "right to engage in homosexual sodomy." 95 Employing
Justice Brandeis' definition of privacy, the dissent characterized the issue
as "the right to be let alone." 96 Justice Blackmun borrowed from an-
other former justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes, to reject the Court's histor-
ical analysis, observing that, "[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for
a rule of law than that.., it was laid down in the time of Henry IV." 97
Justice Blackmun questioned the majority's focus on homosexual activ-
ity, given that the statute also applied to heterosexual activity,98 and dis-
agreed with the majority's refusal to consider the case under Eighth or
Ninth Amendment or equal protection grounds.99 He saved his primary
attack for the majority's refusal to find privacy implications in the case,
stating that "[o]nly the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that
sexual intimacy is 'a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, cen-
91. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
92. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
93. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(b) (Harrison 1990). See supra note 64 and accompanying
text.
94. Id. at 197. Justice Powell's position on this case is an interesting one, worthy of fur-
ther analysis. It was reported that Justice Powell initially voted to invalidate the statute. Al
Kamen, Powell Changed Vote in Sodomy Case, WASH. POST, July 13, 1986, at Al. He later
changed his vote, resulting in the majority upholding the Georgia statute. Justice Powell, now
retired from the Court, has since commented that he "made a mistake" in Bowers v. Hardwick
because he feels the decision is inconsistent with the Court's other privacy decisions. Anand
Agneshwar, Powell Concedes Error in Key Privacy Ruling, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 26, 1990, at 1.
95. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199.
96. Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
97. Id. (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457,
469 (1897)).
98. Id. at 200-01.
99. Id.
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tral to family life, community welfare, and the development of human
personality.' "'o Since the majority refused to recognize any liberty in-
terest, Justice Blackmun noted that Georgia's rationale for violating such
an interest had not been fully considered. He considered the majority's
rationale, and found it wanting. Neither public health and welfare, nor
Georgia's attempt to "maintain a decent society," provide sufficient justi-
fication for regulating "intimate behavior that occurs in intimate
places." ' Justice Blackmun ended by expressing his hope that the
Court would soon see its error and "conclude that depriving individuals
of the right to choose for themselves how to conduct their intimate rela-
tionships poses a far greater threat to the values most deeply rooted in
our Nation's history than tolerance of nonconformity could ever do.""1 2
Justice Stevens also dissented, focusing primarily on the statute's ap-
plication to both heterosexual and homosexual conduct, and Georgia's
apparent intent to enforce the law only against gay men and lesbians. He
found that on the basis of Griswold 103 and Eisenstadt,1" Georgia could
not constitutionally enforce its statute against heterosexual couples. 05
He then questioned how Georgia could justify a selective application of
the law against gay individuals. He said, "[a] policy of selective applica-
tion must be supported by a neutral and legitimate interest-something
more substantial than a habitual dislike for, or ignorance about, the dis-
favored group."' 1 6 Since Georgia had not demonstrated such an interest
when enacting a statute applying to both heterosexual and homosexual
sodomy, the State had not justified its selective application of the law.
E. The Legacy of Bowers v. Hardwick
In addition to being an obstacle to sodomy law reform, Hardwick
has proved to be a formidable barrier to the creation of legal protections
for lesbians and gay men in general. In a suit pending when Hardwick
was decided, the Missouri Supreme Court used Hardwick to justify up-
holding Missouri's sexual misconduct law, even though the case was ar-
gued on equal protection rather than privacy grounds.10 7 Because
Hardwick held that "there is no fundamental right under the United
States Constitution to engage in private consensual homosexual activity,"
the defendant's equal protection claims failed. 08 Other legislatures 09
100. I at 205 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)).
101. I11 at 208-13.
102. Id. at 214.
103. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
104. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
105. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 218.
106. Id. at 219.
107. State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).
108. Id. at 511.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
and courts" 0 considering anti-gay discrimination have relied on Hard-
wick to support the proposition that gay and lesbian individuals are un-
worthy of constitutional protection. The legacy of Hardwick is that the
case is now used by courts and legislatures seeking to deny legal protec-
tions to gay men and lesbians."'
Legislative reform appears to have ended after Hardwick. Although
a public opinion poll following Hardwick showed that a significant
number of Americans disagreed with the Court's decision and its impli-
cations, 2 state legislatures have been reluctant to repeal sodomy
laws. 13 The only post-Hardwick legislative change has been in Tennes-
see, where the crime of sodomy, prohibiting both heterosexual and ho-
mosexual activity, was changed from a felony to a homosexual-specific
misdemeanor. 4 Efforts toward decrimininalization in Maryland, Min-
nesota, and Georgia have been unsuccessful so far.115
Hardwick's failure to address the constitutionality of sodomy laws
applying to heterosexuals1 6 makes it more difficult for gay legal reform
organizations to build alliances with the nongay organizations who were
natural allies prior to Hardwick.117 There are two possible consequences
of the Supreme Court's failure to address Hardwick's application to het-
erosexual behavior. One is that nongay organizations will not be inter-
ested in working to change sodomy laws, because the Supreme Court is
apparently not troubled by the failure to enforce the laws against heter-
osexuals. The other consequence is that nongay organizations may
choose to mount challenges against the application of sodomy laws to
109. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-b:4 (1989) (prohibiting adoption by gay men and
lesbians, and citing Hardwick in legislative history as partial justification.)
110. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.
1990) (citing Hardwick while finding a rational basis for mandating lengthy investigations
before granting gay employees security clearances); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th
Cir. 1989) ("Hardwick... has an impact on the Army's classification of homosexuals."). Id
at 464.
111. Sue Hyde, former director of the Privacy Project for the National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force, states, "The Hardwick decision now is cited over and over again-not just in court
cases, but in the legislative arena-as justification and rationale for denying us basic civil
rights." Cliff O'Neill, Three Years After Hardwick- Sodomy Laws Challenged State by State,
TWN, June 28, 1989, at 3.
112. A Newsweek Polk Sex Laws, NEWSWEEK, July 14, 1986, at 38. Forty-seven percent
of respondents disapproved of the Supreme Court ruling in Hardwick; 57% said states should
not prohibit private sexual practices between consenting adults engaged in same-sex activity.
113. "In many states, legislative repeal efforts have met with stiff resistance from skittish
lawmakers." O'Neill, supra note 111, at 14.
114. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1989).
115. O'Neill, supra note 111, at 14.
116. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. Hardwick effectively distinguished be-
tween those whom the laws theoretically apply to, both heterosexual and homosexual adults,
and those who suffer from the effects of sodomy laws, primarily gay men and lesbians.
117. See Letter to author from William B. Rubenstein, Director of the ACLU Lesbian and
Gay Rights Project (Oct. 27, 1990) (on file with Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly).
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heterosexuals, because previous privacy decisions, and the Court's avoid-
ance of the constitutional issues implicated in heterosexual sodomy
prohibitions, indicate that challenges seeking to invalidate only the por-
tion of the laws which regulate heterosexual behavior may be more suc-
cessful. '18 One commentator has urged attorneys to make challenges to
heterosexual prohibitions only, as those challenges are more likely to be
successful than gay-specific litigation after Hardwick.1 9 There is a po-
tential for conflict when civil liberties activists choose to challenge only
the prohibitions on heterosexual behavior.120 The impetus for further
legislative reform or decisions based on privacy grounds may be slowed
once the laws apply only to same-sex behavior.' 2' Gay organizations
may also face difficulty initiating change and building coalitions with
nongay organizations once heterosexual privacy rights are no longer
infringed.
122
I. State Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Laws
Hardwick has forced gay activists to revise their strategy for eradi-
cating sodomy laws. Activists have explored the option of legislative re-
peal, and today reform efforts continue in Maryland and the District of
Columbia where strategists view legislative reform as an achievable
goal. 12 3 Other reform efforts focus on the overall criminal code recodifi-
cation process. Currently, activists are assisting efforts in Tennessee and
Oklahoma to omit sodomy laws as part of recodification.1
24
The strongest possibility for sodomy law reform may rest with state
courts. The majority in Hardwick expressly stated that its decision did
not affect "state-court decisions invalidating those laws on state constitu-
118. One commentator has noted that "[t]he fact that the Court left open the possibility of
a future Supreme Court challenge on equal protection ... grounds appears at present to set
more of a trap than provide a friendly invitation, especially in light of the High Court's recent
refusal to reverse an Oklahoma court's decision holding that state's sodomy law unconstitu-
tional as applied to consenting adult heterosexuals." SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW
§ 11-119 (M. Newcombe, ed. 3rd release, 1990) (referring to Post v. State, 717 P.2d 1151
(Okla. Crim. App. 1986)).
119. Mitchell Lloyd Pearl, Chipping Away at Bowers v. Hardwick: Making the Best of an
Unfortunate Decision, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 154 (1988).
120. "In [heterosexual sodomy] cases, an advocate seems forced to make an argument dis-
tinguishing Hardwick on the grounds that the decision should be read to apply only to homo-
sexual sodomy. Of course, such arguments can work to undermine equal protection
arguments for lesbians and gay men." Letter from William B. Rubenstein, supra note 117.
121. Id
122. For example, while the national ACLU has policies opposing all sodomy laws, state
affiliates set their own agendas for litigation and legislative reform. Gay-only statutes may not
be considered as high of a priority to some state affiliates as statutes applying to everyone's
sexual behavior, leaving gay organizations in those states to lead the efforts.
123. O'Neill, supra note 111, at 14, 16.
124. Task Force Report, NEWSLETTER OF THE NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK
FORCE, Summer 1990, at 3A (on file with the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly).
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tional grounds." '12 5 After Hardwick, gay activists began the "scramble
... to read articles about and learn how to use state constitutions and
state courts" to further reform.1 2 6 One commentator notes the irony that
people traditionally went to federal court to protect their civil rights be-
cause state courts were unsympathetic to civil rights issues. 2 7 Now state
courts show promise, as state court constitutional challenges have met
with some success after Hardwick. Although the Missouri Supreme
Court reached an unfavorable result in State v. Walsh, 28 that decision
was not based on state constitutional grounds. 2 9 In contrast, trial courts
in Kentucky, 130 Texas,' and Michigan, 132 have invalidated their state's
sodomy laws on the basis of the right to privacy found in their respective
state constitutions. The trial judge in Michigan Organization for Human
Rights v. Kelley 3 adopted the reasoning used in Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent. The judge claimed that "state courts... can and have defined state
privacy guarantees more broadly than the Court in Bowers v. Hard-
wick,"' 34 and found that "[tihis is the case in our state particularly as it
relates to acts occurring in the privacy of one's home."' 35 Activists are
planning similar challenges in Florida and Montana,' 36 states that have
express guarantees of privacy rights in their state constitutions.' 7
A. Arguments in Favor of State Court Challenges
Even prior to Hardwick, commentators noted that the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts both retreated from far-reaching definitions of consti-
tutional rights, and urged those seeking more expansive rights to resort
125. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
126. Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at 64.
127. Id
128. 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986). See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
129. See Reidinger, supra note 34, at 78.
130. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 86M859 (Fayette Dist. Ct. Oct. 31, 1986).
131. Morales v. State, No. 464, 898 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 1990) (enjoining Texas from
further enforcement of sodomy statute). The Texas Human Rights Foundation brought this
case with the help of a number of local gay political and community leaders who served as
plaintiffs. Texas' Anti-Gay Sodomy Law Ruled Unconstitutional, BAY AREA REP., Dec. 13,
1990, at 2.
132. Michigan Org. for Human Rights v. Kelley, No. 88-815820-CZ, opinion and order
(Mich. Cir. Ct. July 9, 1990).
133. Id The Michigan Organization for Human Rights, a statewide gay organization,
sponsored this litigation. The plaintiffs included "homosexual males, lesbian women, a bisex-
ual man and woman, heterosexual men and women, and a woman with a physical disability."
Id. at 2.
134. Id at 9.
135. Id
136. Paula Ettelbrick, Address at the Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom Family
Law Conference (Nov. 17, 1990).
137. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (1981); MoNT. CONsT. art. II, § 10 (1972).
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to state constitutions. 138 Former Associate Justice William Brennan ad-
vocated this strategy as a response to his colleagues' reluctance to recog-
nize or expand civil rights and civil liberties. He stated,
the Court's contraction of federal rights and remedies on grounds
of federalism should be interpreted as a plain invitation to state
courts to step into the breach.... [T]he diminution of federal scru-
tiny and protection out of purported deference to the states man-
dates the assumption of a more responsible state court role.
139
State constitutional challenges present a number of advantages over
federal constitutional challenges. While federal constitutional guarantees
are broadly stated, state constitutions are generally more comprehensive,
and almost code-like in their attention to detail.14° Thus, state constitu-
tions frequently provide explicit guarantees of rights that must otherwise
be read into the broad language of the federal constitution. 141 In addi-
tion, state courts often guarantee rights by stating them affimatively,
while the federal constitution only prohibits governmental interference
with rights. 142 As a result, state courts can more readily implement
unique, state-specific protections that guarantee more rights to the state's
citizens than are found in the federal constitution.143
Another advantage of state court challenges is that such decisions
have only statewide, not nationwide, impact. This is an important factor
affecting the way both state and federal court decisions are made. State
court decisions need merely reflect a reasonable statewide consensus; if a
particular decision does not do so, most state constitutions may be re-
138. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emer-
gence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1141 (1985); Ronald K.L. Collins, Reli-
ance on State Constitutions-l-Away From a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1
(1981); Charles G. Douglas, III, State Judicial Activism-The New Role for State Bills of
Rights, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. Rav. 1123 (1978); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering
the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980); Robert F. Utter & Stanford E.
Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20
IND. L. REv. 635 (1987).
139. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill ofRights and the States: The Revival of State Consti-
tutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 548 (1986) [hereinafter
Guardians]. For Brennan's earlier commentary on the subject, see William J. Brennan, Jr.,
The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 761 (196 1); William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
140. Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1324, 1355 (1982) [hereinafter Developments].
141. Id
142. Id For example, the federal constitution says, "Congress shall make no law ...
prohibiting free speech." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. A state constitution might say, however,
"Citizens are guaranteed the right of free speech." "Thirty-nine state constitutional free speech
provisions are phrased in terms of an affirmative individual right; the negatively phrased first
amendment by its terms merely places a restraint on governmental action." Developments,
supra note 140, at 1399 (citations omitted).
143. Utter and Pitler, supra note 138, at 636.
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vised relatively easily. 14 Federal decisions, especially Supreme Court
decisions, may be limited to what the Court believes is achievable on a
national basis. 145 The Court ever remains concerned about federalism
and the preservation of state autonomy, and may limit the reach of deci-
sions to protect only those rights that reflect a broader nationwide con-
sensus."4 State courts are more able, and are thus encouraged, to
experiment with filling the gaps left by federal court decisions. 47
Federal courts also are highly sensitive to issues of credibility. To
preserve their credibility for the defense of the most important guaran-
tees and principles, the federal courts are apt to be selective in choosing
targets, and restrained when expanding constitutional limits. 148 The fed-
eral courts are the primary guardians of federal constitutional rights, and
their authority may be weakened by each decision that the public per-
ceives to be beyond the limits of the courts' authority. Thus, federal
courts are particularly susceptible to charges of judicial activism.1 49
State courts, however, have been encouraged to engage in what at the
federal level would be labeled judicial activism, as their role is not to
define the minimum levels of protection from government, but to explore
the outer boundaries of rights guaranteed to state citizens.150 In doing
so, state courts less strongly fear the loss of credibility.
Differences in the structure of the federal and state judiciaries may
account in part for differing judicial philosophies underlying the deci-
sion-making process on key constitutional issues. Federal judges are ap-
pointed for life-long terms which remove them from the political process,
while in most states judges are held accountable through the re-election
or reappointment process. 15 ' In some states, judges are elected by popu-
lar vote, either partisan or nonpartisan, and so are beholden to the state's
citizens who elected judges on the basis of a particular approach to deci-
sion-making and expect adherence to that approach.' 52 In other states,
judges are appointed by the executive, but usually serve limited terms,
and may be reappointed through a non-competitive approval election.
53
144. "[A]mendment of state constitutions typically can be initiated easily and is consum-
mated by simple majority vote in a referendum." Developments, supra note 140, at 1354.
145. Id. at 1348-49.
146. Id. at 1348-50.
147. See Guardians, supra note 139, at 548-53. See also Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74 (1980); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982).
148. Developments, supra note 140, at 1350.
149. Id. at 1351.
150. Id at 1357.
151. Id.
152. In 1986, three California Supreme Court justices were recalled because of the electo-
rate's displeasure with their positions against the death penalty. See Mary Ann Galante, Cali-
fornia Justices Face Own "Executions" Bitter Campaign Focuses on Death Penalty, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 3, 1986, at 1.
153. Developments, supra note 140, at 1351.
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Judges in the various state courts reflect a wide range of political and
philosophical values based on the values of the states' citizens. The fed-
eral judiciary, however, primarily reflects the conservative values of the
last two presidential administrations.
1 54
The test the Supreme Court traditionally used to determine whether
to grant certiorari to a state court decision was the presence of "adequate
and independent state grounds."15 5 Under this standard, the Court re-
fused to review any case that could have rested on independent and ade-
quate state law or constitutional grounds, even if the state court based its
decision in part on federal questions. 156 The Court presumed the exist-
ence of independent and adequate state grounds, and if necessary, re-
manded the case for the state court to clarify the basis, state or federal,
for its decision.' 57 Beginning in the mid-1970s with Oregon v. Hass,'1
5
however, the Supreme Court expanded its review of state cases entailing
both state and federal questions. '59 Four decisions between 1977 and
1983 changed the test from a presumption of independent state
grounds.'" The Court indicated that no independent state ground
would now exist if the state court decision was compelled by,'61 depen-
dent on,' 62 or reliant on 1 63 federal constitutional grounds. A state court
decision that was the consequence of federal constitutional precedents
could not evade review under the adequate state grounds test. The most
significant change in the test came in the 1983 case, Michigan v. Long.'
64
As a result of Long, the presumption of independent state grounds was
changed to a presumption against state grounds, unless the decision "in-
dicate[s] clearly and expressly that the [decision] is alternatively based on
bona fide, separate, adequate and independent grounds."1 65 In three
types of decisions, the Court will presume that the state court decision
rests on federal grounds, and thus is subject to review.1 66 The Court will
presume a decision was made on a federal basis if it "appears to rest
154. "By 1992, as many as three-quarters of the country's 752 federal trial and appeals
court judges will owe their jobs to Ronald Reagan or George Bush-if Bush continues to make
appointments at the same pace as Reagan." Godfrey Sperling, Jr., President Bush and the
Courts: What Impact? L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 17, 1989, at 6.
155. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945).
156. Developments, supra note 140, at 1330, 1332.
157. Phyllis S. Bamberger, Methodology for Raising State Constitutional Issues, in RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 291 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 1985).
158. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
159. Bamberger, supra note 157, at 291-92.
160. Id at 292.
161. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977).
162. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553
(1983).
163. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
164. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
165. Id at 1033, 1041.
166. Bamberger, supra note 157, at 295.
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primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law,"167 or
where the adequacy and independence of the decision is unclear. 6 '
Therefore, while a state court may use its own constitution as a basis for
decision despite the existence of a federal analogue, to avoid Supreme
Court review, it must state explicitly the basis under the state constitu-
tion for its decision. In later sections of this Note, the author will en-
courage state courts to make decisions overturning sodomy statutes
under a state right to privacy or other state constitutional grounds.16 9
Since such decisions made on federal constitutional grounds would likely
run afoul of Hardwick, state courts should clearly base the decision on
state grounds; otherwise any victory at the state court level would be
quite short-lived, if appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Another benefit of state court challenges is that they focus attention
upon gay rights issues by bringing the movement to the attention of those
who may not know any openly gay or lesbian individuals, or are largely
unaware of the inequities faced by lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men. 7 '
Challenges mounted on a state level remind individuals in that state that
gay people live not only in San Francisco, New York City, and other
urban areas, but also live in their own state as respected neighbors,
friends, and community members. In addition, mobilization in each
state requires the building of coalitions with non-gay organizations, such
as disabled, civil liberties, and religious groups, which may reap benefits
in areas other than sodomy law reform.' 7 ' Successful challenges in one
state encourage activists in other states to seek similar changes, and may
create the necessary awareness nationwide to further sway public opinion
in favor of reform.
B. Arguments Against State Court Challenges
Anyone contemplating a challenge to a state's sodomy law should
ensure that a legal challenge is the most appropriate way to eliminate the
law, as there are certain risks inherent in each such challenge. First is
the danger that the challenge will draw attention to a largely unenforced
law. Once sodomy laws become subject to a significant amount of public
debate, there is the potential that law enforcement officials will increase
167. Long, 463 U.S. at 1032, 1040-41.
168. Id at 1033.
169. See infra section V.
170. "[Hardwick] has made nongay people aware that in a lot of jurisdictions their sexual
behavior is illegal. I'm not saying that the vast majority of nongay people are now in support
of gay rights; they're not. But they do understand that there is an issue of sexual privacy here
.." Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at 68.
171. "[Tlhis [adverse decision in Hardwick] is a beginning in terms of coalition building."
Id. at 67.
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enforcement to demonstrate their belief that the law is necessary.172
Second, a legal challenge may result in a stricter interpretation of
the law than what previously existed. For example, in states where the
law does not itself define prohibited acts, an opinion interpreting the stat-
ute could further define such acts. 173 In addition, once an adverse case
exists, future challenges, both to the sodomy law and other laws that
affect gay men and lesbians, may become more difficult as future courts,
no matter how sympathetic, may be limited by stare decisis. Individuals
may be less motivated to challenge laws where clear adverse precedent
exists.
Another disadvantage is that litigants attempting a challenge may
face an invasion of their privacy. In criminal cases, depending on the
individual charged and the particular fact situation, defendants may pre-
fer to forego a protracted challenge so as to protect their privacy.17
Plaintiffs seeking a declaratory judgment on the statute's constitutional-
ity sacrifice personal privacy as well. In order to demonstrate the stand-
ing necessary to challenge the statute, they must allege that they engage
in sodomy and plan to continue to do so, and that they have a fear of
prosecution. 175 While plaintiffs obviously must volunteer for declaratory
judgment actions, they should be prepared to face the possible adverse
effects resulting from publicity of the case, including physical danger,
adverse media attention, and invasion of their privacy.
One risk of challenging sodomy statutes is that a public challenge
may galvanize support for those opposing gay rights. As long as gay and
lesbian organizations in the state are relatively invisible and not vocal,
organizations opposing gay rights may not be concerned with the state's
failure to enforce its sodomy laws. When a challenge is made, however,
antigay political activity may coalesce around it, and adamant public op-
position may remain long after the sodomy challenge ends. 176 Adverse
172. In May 1987, two Tennessee men received five-year suspended sentences for felonious
"crimes against nature." The district attorney was quoted as saying that he was trying to
"make an example" of them, to discourage other gay individuals from living there. NDOM
Packet, supra note 45, at 13.
173. For example, if a court determines that oral sex is a "crime against nature," where
previously only anal sex was believed to be prohibited, such a strict definition could lead to
more enforcement.
174. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
175. The standard for standing in a declaratory judgment action is "whether the case in-
volves uncertain or contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may
not occur at all." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 78 (2d ed. 1988)
(quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532, at 112
(2d ed. 1984)).
176. Individuals such as William Dannemeyer or Jerry Falwell, and groups such as Cali-
fornia's Traditional Values Coalition have "declar[ed] war on homosexuality," and closely
monitor the actions of legislators and public officials. Once any action is taken that appears to
support homosexuality, they mobilize opposition forces, and even after the challenge ends,
organizations may remain to obstruct any actions designed to improve the status of lesbians
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results in one state may then negatively influence results in other states.
While decisions of another state court are not binding, judges often ex-
amine what their colleagues in other states have done.
Activists anxious to challenge the sodomy statutes in court also may
neglect other strategies, such as legislative repeal and penal code reform.
While nonjudicial reform may require more work and take more time, it
may have a more lasting effect because the law itself is eradicated, and
not merely held in abeyance by one court's majority. A courtroom deci-
sion may be limited to its facts, or may make only minor adjustments to
the law." One danger of state court challenges is that activists can ne-
glect potentially successful federal court litigation. 7 '
Finally, litigation is expensive and time consuming. Those who
wish to reform sodomy laws must decide which reforms will be the most
beneficial, especially in the gay and lesbian community where limited re-
sources must be used to support a wide variety of reforms. Some mem-
bers of the gay community feel that sodomy law reform is not a top
priority on the gay and lesbian agenda, and oppose focusing energy and
financial resources on this area. 1
7 9
The above arguments in favor of and against litigation of sodomy
law challenges indicate that activists must consider each state individu-
ally; no one model exists that ensures success in each state.
IV. Constitutional Arguments in State Courts
This section will not exhaustively cover each constitutional argu-
ment that may be made in a sodomy law challenge; each of those argu-
ments have entire notes or articles devoted to their application to sodomy
law reform.' This section merely outlines the basis for each constitu-
and gay men. See Sue Hyde, Sex and Politics: Challenging the Sodomy Laws (available from
the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Privacy Project, and on file with the Hastings Con-
stitutional Law Quarterly).
177. See Commonwealth v. Wasson, No 86M859 (Fayette Dist. Ct. Oct. 31, 1986), supra
note 130. "That case, however, was also eventually brought down to a debate on a technicality
that rendered the case useless as a vehicle with which to overturn the state's sodomy law."
O'Neill, supra note 111, at 14, col. 2.
178. Mary C. Dunlap, author of an amicus brief submitted in Bowers v. Hardwick, strongly
warns against this danger. "[R]etreat from development of the United States Constitution (in
whatever direction) is not feasible.... The right to privacy for gay and lesbian persons cannot
be fully developed if we relegate our efforts solely to the patchwork of state legal systems."
Brief Amicus Curiae for the Lesbian Rights Project, Women's Legal Defense Fund, Equal
Rights Advocates, Inc., and the National Women's Law Center, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 949, 951 (1986) (introduction by Mary C. Dunlap).
179. However, as one leading activist counters, "We cannot concentrate on things like
spousal benefits until we put considerable resources into ridding ourselves of sodomy laws."
Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at 62.
180. For privacy, see Nan Feyler, Note, The Use of the State Constitutional Right to Privacy
to Defeat State Sodomy Laws, 14 N.Y.U. RPv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 973 (1986); Craig T. Pear-
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tional argument that activists may use to challenge state sodomy laws.
A. Privacy
181
Hardwick, decided on privacy grounds, forecloses further arguments
based on a right to privacy under the federal constitution." 2 Many
states, however, have provisions in their state constitutions that either
explicitly or implicitly guarantee a right to privacy. 83 Four states ex-
plicitly guarantee such a right. 8 4 Courts in three states have found a
right to privacy within their constitution's search and seizure provi-
sions. 185 Other states have found an implicit right to privacy under their
state constitutions, similar to that which has been found under the fed-
eral constitution.
1 8 6
Whether the right to privacy is explicit or implicit, some states have
found their privacy rights more extensive than those found under the
federal constitution. When there is an explicit right to privacy men-
tioned, the argument for more extensive privacy rights is especially
strong, since the federal constitution does not have an explicit clause
guaranteeing privacy. Some states that have found an implicit right have
found it more extensive than the federal constitution, based on different
case law or different conceptions or formulations of privacy theory. The
state may have been previously willing to disagree with the Supreme
Court on constitutional matters, or to guarantee more rights than the
federal constitution.
B. Equal Protection
Equal protection law under the federal constitution is based on the
Fourteenth Amendment, which states in part, "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."1 87 Although the constitutional lan-
son, Comment, The Right of Privacy and Other Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Statutes,
15 U. TOL. L. Rav. 811 (1984). For equal protection, see Harris M. Miller, Note, An Argu-
ment for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on
Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 797 (1984). For cruel and unusual punishment, see J.
Drew Page, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Sodomy Statutes: The Breakdown of
the Solem v. Helm Test, 56 U. Cm. L. Rv. 367 (1989).
181. The foundations for privacy arguments have been previously discussed in section II.A.
182. See supra notes 80-84.
183. See infra section V for the provisions of states that still have sodomy statutes.
184. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22 (1972); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1972); FLA. CONST. art.
1, § 23 (1981); MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 10 (1972). Florida and Montana continue to retain
sodomy statutes.
185. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 (1910); LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1974); S.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 10 (1971).
186. See infra section V for states that have extended their state constitutional rights be-
yond federal constitutional standards.
187. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
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guage is relatively simple, the Supreme Court has been quite verbose
while developing an equal protection framework; much time is spent di-
vining the meaning of such terms as "discrete and insular minority,"
"heightened scrutiny," and "suspect classification." ' Three standards
have emerged that govern how courts evaluate statutes that appear to
adversely impact one group over another.
The first standard of review, strict scrutiny, applies whenever a stat-
ute infringes upon a "fundamental right," or uses a suspect classifica-
tion.18 9 The Supreme Court has determined that classifications based
upon race, national origin, or alienage are suspect classifications.19 If
strict scrutiny applies, then the use of the classification must be necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest.1 91
The second standard of review, intermediate-level scrutiny, applies
to classifications based on gender and illegitimacy. 192 To satisfy this level
of scrutiny, the classification must serve "important governmental objec-
tives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives."
193
The lowest level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause is
"mere rationality." '94 If the means selected by the legislature rationally
relate to the objective the statute seeks to achieve, the statute will be
upheld. This standard shows great deference to the legislative branch's
right to define its own objectives. 195 Under this standard, statutes are
presumptively constitutional. This presumption may be overcome only
by a showing that the statutes are grossly unfair or irrational. 96
Some commentators have argued that sodomy laws and any statutes
burdening lesbians and gay men should be subject to either strict or
heightened scrutiny. Some sodomy laws apply only to same-sex behav-
ior, and even where laws as written apply to all individuals, they are
often enforced only against those engaged in same-sex behavior. Gay
men and lesbians share several characteristics with groups the Supreme
Court has deemed to be entitled to a strict scrutiny standard: immutabil-
ity of the characteristic (here, homosexuality197), incorrect stereotypes, 198
a history of discrimination, 199 and political powerlessness. 2" The federal
188. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
189. Id. at 440.
190. TRIBE, supra note 175, at 1544.
191. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
192. Miller, supra note 180, at 811-12 (1984).
193. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S 190, 197 (1976).
194. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
195. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
196. TRIBE, supra note 175, at 1445-46.
197. Miller, supra note 180, at 812-13.
198. HARVARD, supra note 6, at 57.
199. Sodomy laws are just one form of discrimination gay men and lesbians have faced.
See id.
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courts that have considered gay-only statutes have generally rejected the
application of heightened scrutiny to statutes disparately affecting gay
men and lesbians. 20 1 The most recent decisions have cited Hardwick as
justification for doing so, although the Hardwick majority expressly
stated that Hardwick was not decided on equal protection grounds.20 2
"The importance of state constitutional equality provisions, and the
fact that they differ significantly from the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, has received little attention." 203  "Attorneys
seeking to challenge sodomy laws, however, should pay close attention to
any equality provisions in their state constitutions, and note that many of
the traditional legal arguments addressed to such disputes [under the fed-
eral constitution] can be 'repackaged' under more specific, or at least sig-
nificantly different, state constitutional equality provisions. ' 2' While
some states do not have an equal protection clause, other provisions that
guarantee equality may provide a basis for equal protection analysis that
differs from that of the Supreme Court. In states that have equal rights
provisions in their state constitutions, attorneys may argue the enforce-
ment of sodomy laws only against those engaged in same-sex behavior
constitutes gender-based discrimination, in that men are prosecuted only
when engaged in activity with other men, and not for engaging in the
same activity with women, and women are prosecuted for engaging in
activity with other women, when they are not prosecuted for engaging in
the same activity with men. In order to ensure that challenges to sodomy
laws are successful, activists should encourage states either to expand the
number of classifications warranting heightened scrutiny, or to formulate
their own tests differing from the Supreme Court's tests which reflect the
unique history of their equality clauses.
C. Void for Vagueness/Due Process
The void for vagueness doctrine arose out of Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment due process theory.20 5 Simply stated, the doctrine requires
that "a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definite-
ness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory en-
200. Id. at 57.
201. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.
1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States, 871
F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
202. "Respondent does not defend the judgment below based on... the Equal Protection
Clause .. " Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 n.8 (1986).
203. Robert F. Williams, Equality and State Constitutional Law, in RECENT DEVELOP-
MENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 157, at 68.
204. Id. at 71.
205. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
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forcement. ' '20 6 Sodomy statutes have generally reflected the reluctance
of legislatures to specifically mention sexual acts, and thus often prohibit
"the abominable and detestable crime against nature," or "deviant sexual
behavior," without specifying what constitutes the crime. Of the
eleven states that do not define the specific acts that are prohibited,2 °0 ten
states have found that the language of the statute is not unconstitution-
ally vague.209 The Supreme Court also has held that a statute defining
sodomy merely as the "crime against nature" is not unconstitutionally
vague.210 If a challenge is made as part of a criminal case where the act
committed has not been prosecuted previously under the statute, then
challenges should be made on vagueness grounds.
D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Two arguments may be made under the Eighth Amendment when
attorneys challenge sodomy statutes. The first argument parallels the
concern shown by Justice Powell for the lengthy sentence imposed under
Georgia law for a sodomy conviction."' Some of the most extreme
sentences that may be imposed for sodomy convictions range from five to
twenty years in prison. 2  Thus, the penalty for sodomy law conviction is
disproportionate to the magnitude of the act, because it may be more
akin to those sentences imposed for rape or armed robbery, although it is
imposed for private, consensual adult sexual behavior.213 Even if no sen-
tence is imposed, a felony conviction carries other possible ramifications,
such as the loss of a professional license, or the inability to hold certain
jobs.214
The second argument is that gay men and lesbians are actually being
punished for their status and not for their behavior. The Supreme Court
held in Robinson v. California215 that it was cruel and unusual punish-
ment to prosecute a person for the status of being a substance abuser.
Later, in Powell v. Texas,216 the Court distinguished Robinson by separat-
ing Powell's status of being an alcoholic from the behavior for which he
was arrested, drinking in public, and upheld his conviction. Courts
would likely follow the same logic and uphold sodomy statutes on the
206. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
207. See infra note 208 for states with statutes that do not specifically define prohibited
behavior.
208. Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina.
209. Each state listed in note 208, except for South Carolina.
210. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975).
211. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
212. See infra section V.
213. Fight for Sexual Freedom, supra note 27.
214. Feyler, supra note 180, at 977.
215. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
216. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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grounds that sodomy statutes regulate sexual behavior, not the status of
being gay or lesbian. If only those known by police to be gay, however,
are arrested and convicted for violations of the sodomy statutes when
such behavior is forbidden to all, what is really at issue is the defendant's
status as gay or lesbian.
E. Establishment of Religion
Previous challenges to sodomy statutes have argued that the statutes
violate the Establishment Clause217 by embodying the religious views of
Judeo-Christian tradition.218 Attorneys can argue that the statutes have
no secular purpose, and therefore legislatures eracting the statutes
sought only to promote particular religious views. In states that have a
legislative history available, debate surrounding passage of the statute
may shed light on the legislature's purpose for enacting the statute. Even
if legislatures holding particular religious values sought to enshrine them
in sodomy statutes, such challenges have not thus far been successful.
Courts respond that it is possible to distinguish morality and religion.
While the two frequently intersect, statutes promoting a particular moral
view may have little or no religious foundations. An Establishment
Clause argument standing alone will thus not have a strong chance of
success. The establishment argument is at its strongest when used to
bolster privacy or equal protection arguments that seek to prove that no
"rational bases" exist for the statutes.
V. Constitutional Arguments by State
This section will look at the history of reform litigation in the states
that retain sodomy statutes, as well as litigation on related constitutional
grounds, to evaluate the possibility of success in each state. Factors ex-
amined for each state include: language of the statute itself, previous
litigation utilizing constitutional theory, willingness of the state to move
beyond federal constitutional guarantees by relying upon state constitu-
tional grounds, and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force's own
evaluation of the reform outlook.
219
217. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law... respecting an establishment
of religion."
218. See, eg., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
("Condemnation of these practices is firmly rooted in Judaeo-Christian moral and ethical
standards.").
219. Privacy Project Fact Sheet, NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE (on file with
the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly). NGLTF rates each state as "very close," "best
chances," "not impossible," or "longshots." These ratings are "an arbitrary division based on
each state's past record, the strength of local organizations, the degree of support from individ-
ual elected officials and other factors." NGLTFs evaluation is primarily concerned with the
possibility of legislative reform. The implications for litigation strategy are two-fold, however.
First, the strength of local gay organizations may dictate whether legal challenges can be suc-
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A. Alabama
Alabama courts have found more extensive rights under Alabama's
constitution than the Supreme Court has found under the federal consti-
tution.220 Courts in Alabama have not decided any sodomy cases utiliz-
ing privacy or equal protection arguments. An appellate court rejected
one challenge to the law made on vagueness grounds.221 NGLTF con-
siders Alabama a "longshot. 2  Attorneys can make challenges on pri-
vacy, equal protection, and Establishment Clause grounds.
B. Arizona
Arizona has a privacy provision in its state constitution.2 2 3 Arizona
courts have relied upon the provision in a case involving the right to
refuse medical treatment.224 Courts have found that the sodomy statute
is not unconstitutionally vague, nor violative of freedom of expression."
NGLTF rates Arizona as "not impossible. '226 Reformers should make
challenges based on privacy and equal protection grounds.
C. Arkansas
Arkansas has one of the most difficult records to overcome for suc-
cessful sodomy law reform. Challenges made on grounds of vagueness
and establishment of religion, 227 federal and state privacy rights,228 and
equal protection229 have all failed to invalidate the law. In reported
cases, Arkansas courts have not recognized a right to privacy more ex-
tensive than that found under the federal constitution. NGLTF calls this
cessfully mounted by these organizations. Second, in states where a negative record precludes
most or all constitutional arguments, and legislative reform chances are good, then working
through the legislative branch for reform may be the best strategy.
220. See Exparte Caffie, 516 So. 2d 831 (Ala. 1987); Exparte Jackson, 516 So. 2d 768 (Ala.
1986). "This Court does not need to await revelation from the federal judiciary when our own
state constitution also guarantees to a criminal defendant the equal protection of the laws." IdL
at 772.
221. Boyington v. State, 227 So. 2d 807 (Ala. App. 1969) (the law does not have to specifi-
cally define what acts are prohibited).
222. See supra note 219.
223. ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 8 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs or his
home invaded, without authority of law."). This has generally been applied only in a Fourth
Amendment context, regarding search and seizure. See State v. Murphy, 570 P.2d 1070, 1072
(Ariz. 1977).
224. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987).
225. State v. Bateman, 547 P.2d 6 (Ariz. 1976).
226. See supra note 219.
227. Connor v. State, 490 S.W.2d 114 (Ark. 1973).
228. Carter v. State, 500 S.W.2d 368 (Ark. 1973).
229. United States v. Lemons, 697 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1983). This case involved public sex.
Since heterosexual couples could be prosecuted if they engaged in public sexual activity, equal
protection was not denied to a gay man prosecuted for engaging in public activity.
Winter 1992] STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO SODOMY LAWS 523
state a "longshot." '23 Since the statute applies only to homosexual sod-
omy, and Lemons involved public sex, the only possible grounds for sod-
omy reform litigation would be on equal protection grounds.
D. District of Columbia
The District of Columbia has an extensive history of sodomy litiga-
tion. The D.C. Court of Appeals found the statute valid both on its face
and as applied when the statute was challenged on equal protection
grounds.231 A challenge made on First Amendment Establishment
Clause grounds also failed.232 The sodomy statute was almost repealed
in 1982, but the District Council and Congress became embroiled in a
dispute over home rule which led to Congress rejecting the law eliminat-
ing sodomy prohibitions.233 NGLTF rates the District of Columbia as a
"best chances" jurisdiction.234
E. Florida
Florida is one of the two states with sodomy laws that has an ex-
plicit right to privacy in its state constitution. 235 Courts have interpreted
this clause more expansively than the federal constitutional right to pri-
vacy.236 A challenge in Florida is one of those next contemplated by
activists.237 While Florida courts have held that the statute is not uncon-
stitutionally vague,238 challenges on equal protection, privacy, or Estab-
lishment Clause grounds have not been foreclosed by precedent.
NGLTF rates this state as "not impossible."23 9 There is a good chance
for reform in this state, based upon the strong state constitutional privacy
provisions and the lack of substantial negative precedent.
F. Georgia
Georgia is the site of Hardwick, the most noteworthy sodomy stat-
ute challenge to date. Activists in Georgia have not stopped working for
reform after Hardwick, however. In 1987, a challenge based on equal
230. See supra note 219.
231. United States v. Cozard, 321 A.2d 342 (D.C. App. 1974).
232. Stewart v. United States, 364 A.2d 1205 (D.C. App. 1976). This case rejected the
argument that sodomy laws were the "direct unbroken legacy of the Christian Church."
233. O'Neill, supra note 111, at 16.
234. See supra note 219.
235. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1980) ("Every natural person has the right to be let alone
and free from governmental intrusion into his private life. .. ").
236. Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990) "It is clear that Florida's right to privacy is
broader than the federal right." .ad at 262.
237. Address by Paula Ettelbrick, supra note 136.
238. See Johnsen v. State, 332 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1976); Bell v. State, 289 So. 2d 388 (Fla.
1973); State v. Fasano, 284 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1973).
239. See supra note 219.
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protection grounds failed.2" Another equal protection challenge made
in 1990 failed for lack of evidence showing that the law was enforced
selectively.241 While NGLTF considers this state a "longshot, ' 242 at-
tempts at reform continue.243 Courts in Georgia have not developed a
right of privacy distinct from the federal constitution, so a cruel and unu-
sual punishment challenge, once someone is actually prosecuted under
the statute, has the greatest potential to be successful.
2 "4
G. Idaho
Idaho has not developed a distinct right to privacy under its state
constitution,245 although a state supreme court justice in a strong dissent
encouraged the court to do so.24 6 Attorneys litigated a sodomy challenge
based on equal protection grounds which failed.247 Idaho is also consid-
ered a "longshot" by NGLTF.245 A cruel and unusual punishment chal-
lenge may be successful, because there is a mandatory five-year sentence
for a sodomy conviction.
H. Kansas
The only challenge which has been made to the Kansas sodomy
statute failed. Because the state convicted the defendant of forcible sod-
omy, he had no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute
as applied to consensual behavior.249 The Kansas statute applies only to
same-sex sodomy, thus it may be challenged on equal protection
grounds. Kansas courts generally have interpreted their state constitu-
tion similar to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal constitu-
tion, but have asserted their willingness to expand guarantees in the
appropriate case.250 NGLTF has called Kansas "not impossible.
'251
240. Gordon v. State, 360 S.E.2d 253 (Ga. 1987).
241. Ray v. State, 389 S.E.2d 326 (Ga. 1990).
242. See supra note 219.
243. O'Neill, supra note 111, at 14.
244. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1986).
245. State v. Kincaid, 566 P.2d 763 (Idaho 1977) (Idaho's right to privacy not as extensive
as Alaska's, since not explicit in the state constitution).
246. State v. Lang, 672 P.2d 561, 563 (Idaho 1983) (Bistline, J., dissenting). "[S]tate
supreme courts are not obliged to parrot the Supreme Court of the United States, but rather
should be at least somewhat inclined to individualistic thinking and judgment."
247. Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 567 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Idaho 1983).
248. See supra note 219.
249. State v. Thompson, 558 P.2d 1079, 1084-85 (Kan. 1976).
250. "[The Kansas Supreme Court] can construe the Kansas constitutional provision so as
to provide greater protection to Kansas citizens than has been afforded to U.S. citizens by the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of a similar provision in the federal Constitu-
tion." State v. Morgan, 600 P.2d 155, 159 (Kan. 1979).
251. See supra note 219.
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I. Kentucky
In the few cases where Kentucky courts have interpreted the Ken-
tucky Constitution in conjunction with the federal constitution, they
have chosen to parallel closely federal rights and protections, making it
somewhat unlikely that sodomy statutes would be violative of the Ken-
tucky Constitution.252 Commonwealth v. Wasson asserts claims under
the Kentucky Constitution, however, and is currently pending in Ken-
tucky courts.25 3 Kentucky has a clean slate in the area of sodomy reform
litigation; no appellate courts have adjudicated the constitutionality of
Kentucky's deviate sexual intercourse law. 2 54 NGLTF rates Kentucky
as "not impossible., 255 The lack of precedent in this area may prove
beneficial to privacy, Equal Protection, and Establishment Clause
challenges.
J. Louisiana
Louisiana's constitution protects against "unreasonable searches,
seizures or invasion of privacy. '2 56 While this protection generally has
been perceived as a search and seizure guarantee, Louisiana courts have
determined that the independent clause "invasion of privacy" has mean-
ing outside of the context of search and seizure issues.257 Courts have
strictly interpreted Louisiana's sodomy law, as it has been held to apply
when the defendant merely approached an officer and was arrested before
any sexual activity occurred.25 8 Other cases have held that the statute is
not unconstitutionally vague,2 59 and may be used against two women. 26
In 1976, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the right to privacy was
not violated by the sodomy law, 261 but the recent development of a
252. See, eg., Louisville Bd. of Realtors v. City of Louisville, 634 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Ky.
1982); Commonwealth v. Appleby, 586 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1978).
253. 785 S.W.2d 67 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990). The circuit court had initially dismissed the case
on procedural grounds, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded to the circuit court for
consideration of the merits of the district court's dismissal of the sodomy statute as unconstitu-
tional. Id
254. The appellate court in Wasson failed to consider the constitutional merits of the stat-
ute, but remanded to the circuit court for a consideration of the merits.
255. See supra note 219.
256. LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1974).
257. See Moresi v. Dept. of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990). "The section
[art. 1, § 5] establishes an affirmative right of privacy impacting on non-criminal areas of the
law." Id. at 1092; State v. Davis, 547 So. 2d 1367 (La. 1989). "[The rights described in
Article 1, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution afford a higher standard of individual liberty
than that granted by the federal Constitution, as interpreted by the jurisprudence." Id. at 1371.
258. State v. Wallace, 466 So. 2d 714 (La. 1985).
259. State v. Mills, 505 So. 2d 933 (La. 1987); State v. Neal, 500 So. 2d 374 (La. 1987);
State v. Picchini, 463 So. 2d 714 (La. 1985).
260. State v. Young, 193 So. 2d 243 (La. 1966).
261. State v. McCoy, 337 So. 2d 192 (La. 1976).
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strong privacy guarantee under the state constitution coupled with the
strict interpretation of the law. assists a litigator to develop a reasonable
argument for reform. NGLTF considers this state a "longshot."262
K. Maryland
NGLTF considers Maryland "very close. ' 263 There has been a con-
siderable amount of legislative activity in this state. Activists plan to
work for reform in 1991, when the composition of the state Judiciary
Committee changes.2 4 On the judicial front, a recent case interpreted
the statute to exclude application to "noncomnmerical, consensual, sexual
intimacies between heterosexual adults in private," thus avoiding the
constitutional issues involved.265 Maryland has generally been unwilling
to interpret its constitution independently to provide more rights than
provided by the federal constitution.266 Challenges based on equal pro-
tection and Eighth Amendment grounds,267 privacy,268 and vagueness
grounds26 9 have all been unsuccessful. Legislative reform appears most
appropriate in Maryland, because of the failure of courts to extend state
constitutional protection and the existence of unfavorable precedent.
L. Massachusetts
Activists and legal scholars debate whether Massachusetts' sodomy
law has been invalidated. A companion statute prohibiting unnatural
and lascivious acts was invalidated by Balthazar v. Commonwealth in
1978.270 While some claim that this invalidation applies to the sodomy
statute as well,2 71 others consider this state unreformed.z72 The Massa-
chusetts Constitution has an explicit right to privacy, 73 which courts
have found to be more extensive than the privacy right under the federal
262. See supra note 219.
263. See supra note 219.
264. O'Neill, supra note 111, at 16.
265. Schochet v. State, 580 A.2d 176 (Md. 1990).
266. Lodowski v. State, 513 A.2d 299 (Md. 1986). "It is true that similar provisions within
the Maryland and United States Constitutions are independent and separate from each other.
Generally, however, comparable provisions of the two constitutions are deemed to be in pan
materia [to be construed similarly]." Id at 306 (citations omitted).
267. Neville v. State, 430 A.2d 570 (Md. 1981).
268. Kelly v. State, 412 A.2d 1274 (Md. 1980); Neville, 430 A.2d 570.
269. Cherry v. State, 306 A.2d 634 (Md. 1973).
270. 573 F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1978) (invalidated MAss. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 35 (1920)).
271. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, supra note 10 (Professor Tribe considers Massachu-
setts reformed). See also, HARVARD, supra note 6, at 9 n.2 ("the [Massachusetts sodomy]
statute was arguably invalidated as applied to private consensual conduct by Commonwealth v.
Balthazar. . .").
272. See, e.g., Letter from Sue Hyde, Director of NGLTF Privacy Project, to author (Nov.
5, 1990) (on file with the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly).
273. MASS. CONST., pt. I, art. XIV.
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constitution.274  NGLTF considers this state a "best chances"
jurisdiction.275
M. Michigan
Whether Michigan Organization for Human Rights v. Kelley will re-
form Michigan's sodomy statute remains to be seen; 276 at present, the
state has declined to appeal its loss in the trial court, making the victory
one of little precedential value.2 7 7 Other Michigan courts have declined
to extend privacy rights beyond the federal constitution.278 A recent de-
cision, however, invalidated a referendum that would have eliminated
state-subsidized abortions, on the grounds that the measure violated the
independent right to privacy under Michigan's constitution. 9 The com-
bination of a strict sodomy law, with the possibility of a fifteen-year sen-
tence, and a newly strengthened state constitutional privacy right could
lead to reform in the near future. NGLTF considers Michigan a state in
the "best chances" category.280
N. Minnesota
Minnesota's sodomy statute was once challenged by a man who had
paid for sex with a minor.281 In this case, the court refused to expand
state constitutional protections to those engaged in commercial sex; how-
ever, the court also carefully noted that "[w]hether the scope of any pri-
vacy right asserted under the Minnesota Constitution should be
expanded beyond federal holdings remains to be resolved in future cases
wherein the issue is properly raised. ' 2 2 This language seems to invite
activists to "properly raise" the issue. Minnesota has already recognized
an independent right of privacy under its state constitution. 2 3 NGLTF
considers this state "very close." '2 84 Given the encouragement provided
by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the state could be one of the next
states in which sodomy laws are eradicated.
274. "We have often recognized that art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights does, or may,
afford more substantive protection to individuals than that which prevails under the Constitu-
tion of the United States." Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 n.9 (Mass. 1987)
(citations omitted).
275. See supra note 219.
276. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
277. Address by Paula Ettelbrick, supra note 136.
278. See, eg., People v. Thivierge, 435 N.W.2d 446, 446-47 (Mich. 1988).
279. Doe v. Director of the Dep't of Social Serv., 468 N.W.2d 862 (Mich. 1991).
280. See supra note 219.
281. State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987).
282. Id. at 114.
283. Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148 (Minn. 1988).
284. See supra note 219.
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0. Mississippi
Mississippi has recognized a right to privacy in its state constitu-
tion.2"5 Mississippi's constitution also contains a search and seizure pro-
vision,286 but no cases have interpreted this provision independently from
the federal constitution. Mississippi's sodomy statute has been found not
unconstitutionally vague.287 NGLTF calls this state a "longshot." 28 In
general, while the lack of many previous challenges is beneficial, Missis-
sippi's general unwillingness to extend additional constitutional rights,
despite In re Brown, indicates that this state would likely follow
Hardwick.
P. Missouri
State v. Walsh has been the most significant sodomy reform case in
Missouri.28 9 This case forecloses challenges on an equal protection basis.
The Missouri Supreme Court declined to consider the privacy issues, be-
cause privacy was not the basis of the lower court's decision. The court
made clear, however, that it would not expand the Missouri Constitution
to invalidate sodomy laws on a privacy basis.29 In other cases, Missouri
also has been unwilling to expand state constitutional rights beyond the
federal constitution.291 NGLTF considers Missouri "not impossible.
'292
The Privacy Rights Education Project currently is engaged in lobbying
and educating legislators and the populace.293
Q. Montana
Montana has the combination of a relatively strict, gay-only sodomy
statute2 94 and an explicit privacy guarantee in the state constitution.295
Reform seems to have been prevented thus far only by a lack of willing
285. See In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985) (finding a state constitutional right to
privacy inherent in MIss. CONST. art. III, § 32).
286. MISS. CONsT. art. III, § 23.
287. State v. Mays, 329 So. 2d 65 (Miss. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976).
288. See supra note 219.
289. 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986). See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
290. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d at 511.
291. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). "Neither the federal nor
the Missouri constitutions expressly provide a right of privacy. In State v. Walsh, this Court
was asked to recognize an unfettered right to privacy. We declined to do so." Id. at 417
(citation omitted).
292. See supra note 219.
293. Arlene Zarembka and Zuleyma Tang Halpin, Presentation at Lavender Law II, the
Second National Conference on Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues (October 8, 1990).
294. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1991) prohibits "deviate sexual conduct" between
members of the same sex. Those convicted of violating the statute may be sentenced for up to
10 years in prison, or fined up to $50,000.
295. MONT. CONsT. art. II, § 10 (1989).
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litigants to challenge the statute.296
Montana has previously found the state constitution's privacy guar-
antees to be more extensive than the federal constitution's guarantees.29 7
NGLTF rates this state as "not impossible," probably due to the lack of
strong local organizations willing to mount challenges.298 Because of the
explicit privacy guarantee in the state constitution, the outlook for judi-
cial reform seems very strong, and Montana is one of the next challenges
contemplated by activists.29 9
R. Nevada
Doe v. Bryan is the only reported case interpreting the Nevada sod-
omy statute, and was not a true challenge3co The court found that the
plaintiff lacked standing, since there was no indication of a threat of
arrest.30 1 This precedent may make future civil challenges difficult, but
does not preclude challenges in criminal cases. Nevada generally has
chosen to follow the federal constitution in interpreting individual
rights.3 "2 NGLTF considers this state "not impossible."30 Once a chal-
lenge overcomes the difficulty of achieving standing, the lack of negative
precedent may bode well for its success.
S. North Carolina
Although parties have challenged North Carolina's sodomy statute
on constitutional grounds, the North Carolina courts have found, with-
out discussion, that the statute is not unconstitutional." 4 North Caro-
lina courts have also determined that the "crime against nature" statute
is not unconstitutionally vague."0 5 An appellate court determined that a
candidate for a police officer position could be required to answer ques-
296. O'Neill, supra note 111, at 14.
297. State v. Sorensen, 792 P.2d 363 (Mont. 1990). "The protection afforded under Mon-
tana's constitutional right of privacy is broader than the right of privacy guaranteed under the
United States Constitution." Id. at 366.
298. See supra note 219.
299. Address by Paula Ettelbrick, supra note 136.
300. 728 P.2d 443 (Nev. 1986). This case was an action for declaratory relief, not a crinii-
nal prosecution.
301. Id
302. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990). "Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitu-
tion of the State of Nevada tracks the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion in protecting its citizens against deprivation of their right to liberty without due process of
law." Id at 622.
303. See supra note 219.
304. See, eg., State v. Enslin, 214 S.E.2d 318 (N.C. 1975) (appellants argued under the 1st,
3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th, and 14th Amendments, but no further detail was provided); State v. Adams,
264 S.E.2d 46 (N.C. 1980) (finding statute constitutional).
305. See State v. Poe, 252 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. 1979), discr rev. denied, 259 S.E.2d 304 (N.C.
1979).
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tions about homosexual activity during a polygraph test, since Hardwick
found that engaging in homosexual activity is not a fundamental right.3"6
North Carolina courts have not found a separate right to privacy within
their state constitution, and thus are not likely to depart significantly
from Hardwick. North Carolina is a "longshot" state, according to
NGLTF.3 °7
T. Oklahoma
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has invalidated the portion of the
sodomy statute that proscribes the sexual activity of heterosexual
couples.308 In that case, the court never reached the question of whether
the prohibition of homosexual activity was unconstitutional. 3
Although Post was decided prior to Hardwick, and appears to be in di-
rect conflict with it,310 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the
case.31' Oklahoma courts have found that the statute is not unconstitu-
tionally vague,3"' and applies to two females as well as two males or a
male and a female. 3 Challenges can be made on privacy and equal pro-
tection grounds, although Oklahoma courts have not independently in-
terpreted the state constitution, and so the result may closely parallel
Hardwick. The statute provides for a ten-year sentence,31 4 and so chal-
lenges should be made on cruel and unusual punishment grounds should
someone actually be sentenced under the statute. NGLTF considers
Oklahoma a "longshot" state. 5
U. Rhode Island
Rhode Island's sodomy statute contains one of the nation's strictest
penalties, imprisonment for up to twenty years. 6 Sodomy is defined
only as the "abominable and detestable crime against nature," but the
Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that the statute is not unconstitu-
tionally vague,3 17 nor violative of the right to privacy. 318 A 1980 case
306. Truesdale v. University of N.C., 371 S.E.2d 503 (N.C. 1988).
307. See supra note 219.
308. Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 890 (1986).
309. Id at 1109-10.
310. "It now appears to us that the right to privacy, as formulated by the Supreme Court,
includes the right to select consensual adult sex partners." 715 P.2d at 1109.
311. 479 U.S. 890 (1986).
312. Plotner v. State, 762 P.2d 936 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); Casady v. State, 721 P.2d
1342 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986); Peninger v. State, 721 P.2d 1338 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986);
Hicks v. State, 713 P.2d 18 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
313. Warner v. State, 489 P.2d 526 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
314. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (1990).
315. See supra note 219.
316. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1986).
317. State v. Gibbons, 418 A.2d 830, 834 (R.I. 1980); State v. Levitt, 371 A.2d 596 (R.I.
1977).
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held that the purpose of the statute was to proscribe all extra-marital
copulation.3 19 The Rhode Island Supreme Court occasionally has recog-
nized a right to privacy under the state constitution in search and seizure
cases.320 This state is a "best chances" state, according to NGLTF.321
While Rhode Island has not recognized fully a state constitutional right
to privacy, a sodomy challenge could firmly establish such a right.
V. South Carolina
South Carolina is the only state where a vagueness challenge is fore-
closed neither by the specificity of the law, nor by previous interpretation
of the statute, because only "the abominable crime of buggery," without
further definition, is prohibited by the statute.322 Courts have mentioned
the state constitution in the context of individual rights only in search
and seizure cases, and did not give the South Carolina Constitution in-
dependent significance. This state is another "longshot" state, according
to NGLTF,323 but the judicial history provides a clean slate for attorneys
attempting reform.
W. Tennessee
Tennessee recently revised its sodomy provision from one applying
to both heterosexual and homosexual acts, 324 to one prohibiting only
same-sex behavior. 325 No cases have challenged the validity of this new
statute. Tennessee also lessened the penalty under the new statute, which
may indicate the legislature's opinion regarding its lack of seriousness.
Nonetheless, because the law specifically discriminates against gay men
and lesbians, it should be challenged on equal protection grounds.32 6 In
the few cases in which Tennessee courts have simultaneously interpreted
the federal and Tennessee constitutions, the courts have found similar
rights and guarantees under both constitutions, and have not established
the independence of the provisions of the Kentucky Constitution.
NGLTF considers Tennessee "not impossible, ' 327 but the small penalty
318. Gibbons, 418 A.2d at 834; State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980).
319. Santos, 413 A.2d at 64.
320. See, ag., Pimental v. Department of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348, 1350 (citing Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967), in which the United States Supreme Court recognized the
ability of the states to impose higher search and seizure standards than those found under the
federal constitution).
321. See supra note 219.
322. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985). No reported cases have inter-
preted the statute.
323. See supra note 219.
324. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-612 (1982) (a felony with a possible 5 to 15 year sentence).
325. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1989) (a Class C misdemeanor, punishable by a $25
fine).
326. O'Neill, supra note 111, at 14.
327. See supra note 219.
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currently in force may make it difficult to mobilize activists for reform.
X. Texas
In January 1992, oral arguments were heard in a Texas appellate
court in Morales v. State, since the state attorney general chose to chal-
lenge a trial court's recent declaration that the statute was unconstitu-
tional.328 Texas courts have already noted a distinct right to privacy
under the Texas Constitution.329 A previous challenge was rejected in a
decision that was issued shortly after Hardwik.330 According to
NGLTF, Texas is among the "best chances" states,331 and given the cur-
rent governor's support of sodomy law reform,332 such reform could hap-
pen soon, perhaps as a result of Morales v. State.333
Y. Utah
There have been no reported cases challenging the validity of the
sodomy law in Utah. The state has shown a willingness, however, to
differ from the Supreme Court in the area of Fourth Amendment protec-
tions334 and equal protection doctrine.335  This state is considered a
"longshot" by NGLTF,336 but Utah's lack of negative precedent makes
reform feasible.
Z. Virginia
Virginia was the site of a 1975 reform attempt that reached the
United States Supreme Court, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.3 37 In
Doe, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the lower court,331 which
328. Texas Human Rights Foundation's Case Challenging "Sodomy Statute" Goes to the
Appellate Level, NEWS RELEASE (Texas Human Rights Found.), Dec. 2, 1991. The state's
decision to appeal is a positive development in the case. An appellate court's finding that the
statute is unconstitutional would be reported and have more precedential value, and if the
intermediate court reversed the trial court's decision, the case could be taken to the Texas
Supreme Court for adjudication. The appellate court's decision was not available at time of
publication of this Note.
329. May v. State, 780 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1989) ("implicit right of privacy under the Texas
Constitution has also been acknowledged by Texas courts .... "). Id at 870.
330. Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985).
331. See supra note 219.
332. Arthur S. Leonard, Texas Trial Court Rules Sodomy Law Unconstitutional, LES-
BiAN/GAY LAW NoTEs, Jan. 1991, at 1.
333. Id.
334. State v. LaRocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990).
335. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984).
336. See supra note 219.
337. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
338. 425 U.S. 901 (1976). The summary affirmance sparked a debate about the preceden-
tial value of Doe which lasted until the Hardwick decision was announced. See Hardwick v.
Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1207-08 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (found Doe not binding, since that case could
have been decided on standing grounds).
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had held no right to privacy was violated by sodomy statutes.339 In 1986,
a Virginia court held that sodomy statutes were not violative of equal
protection guarantees.3'" Virginia courts have proven reluctant to ex-
pand constitutional guarantees under the state constitution. 41 Virginia
is considered a "not impossible" state by NGLTF. 42
VI. Conclusion
Because there is no indication that Bowers v. Hardwick will be over-
ruled in the immediate future, state constitutions provide fertile ground
for activists seeking to overturn sodomy laws. Reformers should en-
courage state courts to interpret their state constitutional right to privacy
to encompass private consensual sexual behavior between adults. Such
interpretation does not run afoul of Hardwick, to the extent it is explic-
itly made on independent state grounds. In addition, reformers should
urge states to find homosexuality a suspect or quasi-suspect classification,
and invalidate sodomy laws on an equal protection basis, which would
have an impact on many other areas besides sodomy law reform. Where
warranted by individual state sodomy statutes, parties should assert
Eighth Amendment claims as well. While conditions in each state
should be carefully considered to evaluate the chance of success and the
price of failure, attorneys should aggressively litigate the constitutional-
ity of sodomy laws in state courts. This can ultimately achieve what
Hardwick failed to accomplish: the eradication of state sodomy laws.
When sodomy laws are eradicated, the right to choose one's sexual part-
ner and means of sexual expression without governmental interference
will never again be considered "facetious." '343
339. 403 F. Supp. at 1201.
340. Fletcher v. Commonwealth, No. 0405-85 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1986).
341. See, eg., Wells v. Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 19 (Va. 1988). "Article 1, § 10 of the
Virginia Constitution and the fourth amendment are substantially the same." Id. at 21 n.l.
342. See supra note 219.
343. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).

